After last week’s Bluenami, my news feed has been filled with people proposing early policy agendas for the incoming Democratic majorities in the House and Senate. This compilation from New York Times opinion writers isn’t bad. For trade nerds, Peter Harrell put together good proposals on restoring congressional power over trade policy, starting with repealing Sections 338 and 122, which Trump has used to backstop his tariff agenda after the Supreme Court declared his “Liberation Day” tariffs under IEEPA illegal. I’ll add to the pile-on, but like Peter, I’ll keep it focused on my chosen policy area: economic security/tech competition.
I intended for economic security to be a main focus when I started Machine Politics back in March. Since then, I haven’t written much on it other than a call for a change in US investment screening policy against China. Part of the reason for that is under this administration, good ideas just haven’t mattered. Yes, the funding from the Pentagon’s Office of Strategic Capital (OSC) for critical minerals extraction and refining projects is, in principle, a good step towards reducing US vulnerability to Chinese economic coercion. But in practice, OSC funds have been doled out in sweetheart no-bid contract deals to Trump cronies and affiliates. Nvidia was able to quash a Commerce Department investigation into Megaspeed (the company whose CEO Jensen Huang was sleeping with) just by asking the head of the Bureau of Industry and Security, Jeff Kessler. Commerce Secretary Howard Lutnick’s investing firm Cantor Fitzgerald, named Nvidia its top semiconductor stock pick as recently as August.
The determining factors for American economic security under the second Trump administration from policy formation, to funding and enforcement have been access, quid pro quo, and brown-nosing the president. Competence and, you know, the national interest just haven’t factored in at all. While I was working in government relations and since, there has been a pervasive malaise among tech policy hands whether you were in industry, government, or a think tank of “why bother?” And I carried that malaise with me into becoming a guy writing on Substack for about 12 people - until last week.
The twin occurrences of the midterm blowout and the Jensen Huang affair(s) have opened a window for some actually good and interested economic security policy that has been percolating for a while to get passed. Here’s a quick overview of the pending legislation that has a good chance of either being passed in the lame duck session as part of the NDAA or in early January. As I’ll lay out below, many of these proposals have overwhelming bipartisan support, so even if they are not included in the NDAA, they could potentially pass with veto-proof majorities once Congress has leadership that will let them make it to the floor.
The Multilateral Alignment of Technology Controls (MATCH) Act would anchor export controls on semiconductor manufacturing equipment (SME) in a statute, so no administration could lift them through executive action. This includes controls on extreme ultraviolet (EUV) and deep ultraviolet (DUV) lithography equipment necessary to produce leading edge GPUs and memory chips. It also sets a 150-day deadline for negotiations with allies (namely the Netherlands and Japan, the home countries of ASML and Tokyo Electron, respectively) to align their export restrictions with the US. If they don’t, the US would unilaterally implement extraterritorial controls through the foreign direct product rule. MATCH would also restrict servicing of equipment already in China.
The MATCH Act advanced out of the Republican-controlled House Foreign Affairs Committee with bipartisan support 36-8. It faces pushback from industry mainly over the concern that the servicing ban would cut off a revenue stream for companies in allied countries like ASML. Industry groups argue the ban would have little impact on Chinese chipmaking capacity as local companies could provide repair services and spare parts. Other experts argue China wouldn’t be able to easily replace the technical know how from foreign SME makers to keep the world’s most complicated machines running.
The Remote Access Security Act (RASA) closes the loophole in US export controls that allows Chinese companies that can’t import leading edge chips to use chips in another country via the internet or a cloud service. Remote access computing is one of the services Alice Huang’s company Megaspeed provides to clients in China (along with allegedly physically smuggling in controlled chips like H200s). RASA grants the Commerce Department authority to determine what items are covered. While leaving so much up to the discretion of the executive branch is a risk, RASA would move the ball in the right direction to close a completely open avenue for Chinese firms to legally circumvent US export controls. The House passed it 369-22 after it advanced out of the Foreign Affairs Committee with unanimous support.
The best backronym so far: the Artificial Intelligence Oversight of Verified Exports and Restrictions on Weaponizable Advanced Technology to Covered High-Risk Actors Act (AI OVERWATCH) would require the administration to notify Congress before it approves AI chip exports to China, Cuba, Iran, North Korea, or Russia.1 Congress would then have 30 days to block the export by passing a joint resolution of disapproval in both chambers. The bill would also terminate existing licenses and implement a blanket denial of exports to the listed countries of concern. Before approving any exports to countries of concern, the administration must present Congress with a strategy that provides an assessment of Chinese chipmaking capabilities and whether US chip exports to China would meaningfully reduce the Chinese Communist Party’s efforts to pursue indigenous production of leading edge chips. That would require the administration to at least address in writing the main argument from figures like Jensen Huang and David Sacks, that US chip exports keep China reliant on the US tech stack. Many tech and China experts are skeptical of the “keep them addicted” argument and point to China’s self-imposed restrictions on Nvidia chip imports and the CCP’s focus on “new productive forces”.
AI OVERWATCH also advanced out of the House Foreign Affairs Committee with an overwhelming bipartisan majority 42-2 despite resistance from the White House. It’s currently included in the Senate NDAA version. The Overwatch text in the NDAA could also become the vehicle for remote access restrictions rather than RASA.
What next?
The bills listed above have been percolating for months in the current Republican-led Congress despite the malaise I mentioned. That said, they’ve been stalled due to resistance from the White House and close Trump confidants like Jensen Huang. Now that Huang’s affairs have caused a dual market and espionage scandal, the sidelined China hawks have an open lane to push new statutory controls and congressional oversight. I believe remote access licensing procedure should also include a congressional disapproval mechanism and should not simply be left up to this (or any) Commerce Department’s discretion.
There’s a good chance some version of MATCH, RASA, and/or AI OVERWATCH become law through the NDAA. If not, Democrats could push against an open door in January to pass them with veto-proof bipartisan majorities. Beyond that, the new Democratic majorities must investigate to what degree Commerce Department leadership was compromised or influenced by their entanglements with companies like Nvidia. Here’s a clear case where strong ethics rules and a clear wall of separation between policymakers and private interests can shore up national security.
While I believe new restrictions like the MATCH Act are good and necessary policy at this stage, there is a question of how China will react to what they could well perceive as an escalatory move from the US. New chip controls could blow up the tentative truce the Trump administration negotiated after its spiraling trade war with China over the summer of 2025. China could formally reimpose controls on critical mineral exports or merely informally throttle them to exert pressure. Neither side seems to have much appetite for another round at the moment. Plus, Congress reasserting control over trade policy could help serve as a de-escalatory measure there to keep the conflict from expanding to other areas.
Finally, I’ll just note that all the bills I mentioned here are fundamentally defensive measures. For playing offense long-term with something like Jake Sullivan’s proposal for a strategic investment fund or enabling US intelligence services to conduct economic espionage, we first have to reign in a runaway executive branch porous to corporate and foreign influence. Empowering the current administration with another slush fund or spies stealing trade secrets to share with hand-picked favorites will not improve America’s economic security. For now, I’d be happy if we could begin by repairing some of the damage the current administration has done to government-funded science and R&D.
Footnotes
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The bill text also makes reference to the Maduro regime in Venezuela, but I imagine that ban will either be removed in the final text or be ruled moot under the current political situation. ↩